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Abstract：Online game is a typical E-business indusry. Firstly, the problem is pointed out that the present researches on 
supply chain contracts designed for tangible traditional products have not considered the characteristic of intangible products 
such as online game industry. Secondly, the members and operation progress of the supply chain are explored in online game 
industry. Thirdly, a new supply chain contract model is provided for online game industry under the reference to the existed 
contracts models. At last, a mathematical example is provided, the profits for the whole supply chain and the profits for 
every member have been compared with between in the new contract model and in the old contract model, and the results 
shows the new contract model is better. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Online game is a typical E-business indusry. It is also an emerging entertainment software industry. It is 
successful and fast growing. The online game market is expected to reach $4.4 billion by 2010 according to data 
released by Parks Associates.In addition to traditional game industry companies like publishers, hardware and 
console manufacturers, the research included other sources new to the gaming sector including portals like 
Yahoo, Real Networks and AOL; and NHN Corporation, which operates an online gaming site in Korea and 
recently opened U.S. operations. Those companies are going to help the market grow, along with dominant 
players like Microsoft, EA, and other traditional industry companies. Supporting these revenues are PC gamers 
who spend an average of 18.5 hours per week playing games, and 70 percent of PC gamers take part in 
multiplayer mode online. In comparison, console gamers play an average 13.6 hours per week, portable games 
are played 8.9 hours on average, and mobile games about 4.6 hours. 
The supply chain of online game industry is made up of game developer, operational company, retailer and 
online game player. Optimal supply chain performance requires the execution of a precise set of actions. 
Unfortunately, those actions are not always in the best interest of the members in the supply chain, i.e., the 
supply chain members are primarily concerned with optimizing their own objectives, and that self-serving focus 
often results in poor performance. So supply chain is a typical system that needs to be coordinated. All the 
trade-offs among the firms in supply chain are fulfilled by contracts, so all the means that help to achieve 
coordination will be restricted by contracts. The supply chain contracts are one of the most important problems 
in supplying management as the foundation to coordinate supply chain. 
 
2.  LITERATURES REVIEW 













 and revenue sharing
[11-12]
. The models used in 
these contracts include EOQ, newsboy problem, Nash equilibrium, stackelberg equilibrium. The typical 
literatures on supply chain contracts have been listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Typical literatures on supply chain contracts 
Type of contract  Typical literatures 
Quantity discount 
Crowther (1964)；Monahan（1984）；Lee and Rosenblatt（1986）；Jolekar（1988）；Lal and Staelin(1984)；
Deezner and Wesolowsky（1989）；Dada and Srikanth（1987）；Kohli and Park（1989）；Weng and Wong
（1993）；Weng（1995） 
Return Pasternack（1985）；Emmons and Gilbert（1998）；Tsan-Ming Choi,Duan Li and Houmin Yan(2004) 
Backup agreements Gary.D.Eppen and Ananth.V.Iyer（1997） 
Quantity flexibility Tsay（1999）；Jianghua Wu（2005） 
Option 
Dawn Barnes-Schuster,Yehuda Bassok and Ravi Anupindi(2002)；Zhiping Chang and Fu Jiang（2004）；Shihua 
Ma，Jianyang Hu and Yong Lin（2004） 
Channel rebates Terry.A.Taylor（2002） 
Revenue sharing 
Cachon and Lariviere（2000）；Yigal Gerchak and Yunzeng Wang (2004)；Ilaria Giannoccaro and Pierpaolo 
Pontrandolfo (2004) 
 
However, the existed supply chain contracts are mainly designed for traditional and tangible products 
without thinking about the characteristics of digital products such as online game. The rapid development in 
online game industry provides us a challenge to research. The profits models for traditional and tangible 
products mainly think about the marginal manufacturing cost, purchasing cost, transportation cost, storage cost 
and so on. Furthermore, the marginal manufacturing cost percent in retail price is very high. The costs of online 
game products are mainly research and development costs, and the costs are very large. Once research and 
development succeeds, the marginal manufacturing cost will be very small, and the marginal manufacturing cost 
percent in retail price is very little. As regards storage and transportation, thinking about the very little volume 
and weight, the storage cost and transportation cost are very little. All the difference between traditional tangible 




3.1 Notes  
c:  the cost of developing online game software；  
c1: agent cost operational company offered to develop company 
c2: marginal manufacturing cost for each online game card in operational company 
c3:  the license fee retailer offered to operational company in the new contract 
c4:  the marginal retail cost of retailer 
c5:  the fixed cost of retailer 
c6:  the fixed cost in operational company  
ω
0: the wholesale price of each online game card operational company selling to retailer in the old contract 
ω :  the wholesale price of each online game card operational company selling to retailer in the new contract 
Ф 1:  the revenue proportion retailer shared, and (1-Ф 1) is offered to operational company in the new contract 
Ф 2:  the revenue proportion operational company shared, and (1-Ф 2) is offered to developer company  
 :  the cost operational company offered to telecom company for each online game card 
p:  the retail price for each online game card retailer offered to online game player 
q:  the online game card quantity is ordered by retailer from operational company  
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( )F x : the probability distribution function for the demand quantity to online game card 
( )S q : the expected sale quantity of online game card, and 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) 
q




:  the profit of retailer in the old contract 
π2
0
:  the profit of operational company in the old contract 
π3
0
:  the profit of developer in the old contract  
π
0
:  the profit of the whole supply chain in the old contract 
π1:  the profit of retailer in the new contract 
π2:  the profit of operational company in the new contract 
π3:  the profit of developer in the new contract  
π:  the profit of the whole supply chain in the new contract 
 
3.2 Description for Operation Progress in the Old Contract 
The operation progress in the old contract is described as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The operation progress in the old contract 
 
3.3 the Old Contract Model 
According to the description on the operational process of the old contract in the online game industry and 
relevant parameter, the profit equations for each company are provided: 
the profit of retailer 
1 0 4 5p ( ) ω c cS q q q                                      (1) 
the profit of operational company 
2 2 0 2 1 6ω c ( ) c cq q S q                                  (2) 
The profit for developer 
3 2 0 1(1 )ω c -cq                                  (3) 
Offering agent cost 
Offering revenue share 







Offering service cost 
Providing service 
Selling online game card
（higher wholesale price） 
Offering online game card price Selling online game card 
Offering online game card price 
Online game player 
Retailer 
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The profit for the whole supply chain 
2 4 5 6p ( ) c c ( ) c c cS q q q S q                              (4) 
In order to get the optimal order quantity 
q
to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain, we get the 
derivative about  . 
2 4
( ) ( )
p c c 0
d dS q dS q
dq dq dq
  
      
 
2 4p [1 ( )] c c [1 ( )] 0F q F q
         
 













                            
(5)
 









    
 
0 4p [1 ( )] ω c 0F q       

















p  is about 80%, p

 is about 4%,
2 4c +c
p  is about 0.5%,so it is easy to get the result 








，because ( )F x  is the probability distribution function for the demand 
quantity to online game card, ( )F x  is a monotony increasing function. So 1( )F q  is also a monotony 
increasing function. It is easy to get the result 










, namely *q q ，so the whole supply chain do not get to 
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coordination. This paper will validate with data analysis. 
 
3.4 Reference to the Contracts in Traditional Industry  
Thinking about the following reasons, this paper provides a new profits model for the supply chain in 
online game industry using the thought of revenue sharing. The thought of revenue sharing has been 
successfully used in the video rental industry, and the pivotal reason is that the rental quantities are monitored 
accurately using scanning beam at the doors of the video rental retailers.  
However, there are some difference between online game industry and video rental industry. The key 
difference is that although the marginal manufacturing cost percent in retail price is very small in video rental 
industry, the marginal manufacturing cost percent in retail price is much smaller in online game industry. 
According to the thought of revenue sharing in video industry, operational company will sell the online game 
card to retailers with the price below the marginal manufacturing cost, but the marginal manufacturing cost itself 
is very little, about 0.02$, this means operational company gave gratis online game cards to retailers. 
Operational company does not agree with because operational company has offered to developer a large number 
fund for a power of attorney bearing all the risk. In order to deal with this problem, thinking about reducing  
the risk of operational company, the paper suggest that retailer should offer to operational company a fund for 
the license of online game card before the revenue sharing contract was designed between operational company 
and retailers. Thus operational company can take back part of large agent costs beforehand and reducing risk. 
 
3.5 Description for Operation Progress in the New Contact  
The operation progress in the old contract is described as Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The operation progress in the new contract 
 
3.6 Building the New Contract Model  
According to the description on the operational process of the new contract in the online game industry and 
relevant parameter, the profit equations for each company are provided: 
the profit of retailer 
  1 1 4 3 5
p ( ) ω c c cS q q q         
                      (7) 
Offering agent cost 
Offering revenue share 







Offering service cost 
Providing service 
Selling online game card
（lower wholesale price） 
Offering online game card price Selling online game card 
Offering online game card price 
Online game player 
Retailer 
Offering license fee 
Offering revenue share 
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the profit of operational company 
2 2 1 3 2 1 6[(1 ) p ( ) ω c ] c ( ) c cS q q q S q                              (8) 
the profit for developer 
3 2 1 3 1(1 )[(1 ) p ( ) ω c ] c -cS q q                            (9) 
the profit for the whole supply chain 
2 4 5 6p ( ) c c ( ) c c cS q q q S q                             (10) 
In order to get the optimal order quantity q to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain, we get the 
derivative about  . 
2 4
( ) ( )
p c c 0
d dS q dS q
dq dq dq
  
      
 
2 4p [1 ( )] c c [1 ( )] 0F q F q
         
 













                               
(11)
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(12)
 
In order to make the whole supply chain get to coordination, the condition q = q  must be satisfied. 
2 4 1 4
1
(p ) (c +c ) p (ω+c )
p p













4. DATA  ANALYSIS 
In this paper, the demand quantity χ is random and submitted to normal distribution, namely χ～N（

，σ）. 
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According to the data of the report on online game industry in China, the relevant parameter is listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Parameter and value 
parameter  value parameter value 
c 17000000   2 
c1 90000000 c6 30000000 
c2 0.4 p 50 
c3 35000000 c4 0.1 
ω 0 35 Ф 1 30% 
Ф 2 60% c5 8000000 
μ 40000000   6000000 
 
According to the value of parameter in Table 2, we can compute the profit of each company in the old 













  qFFq  
Because q < q ，the supply chain is not coordinated，and according to the equation (1),(2),(3),(4) 
1 =483982213.84， 2 =567098836.85， 3 =588466438.62， =1639547489.31 
Similarly, we can compute the profit of each company in the new contract model. According to the 







[ 11**00 FFqq 53865948 
Because q q ，the supply chain is coordinated，and according to the equation (7),(8),(9),(10) 
1 =548263728.51， 2 =640866621.53， 3 =647913581.20， =1837043931.24 
The profit of each company in the old contract model is compared with the profit of each company in the 
new contract model, the result is described as Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Profit comparation 
profit retailer operational company developer the whole supply chain 
In the old contract 483982213.84 567098836.85 588466438.62 1639547489.31 
In the new contract 548263728.51 640866621.53 647913581.20 1837043931.24 
Increased profit 64281514.67 73767784.68 59447142.58 197496441.93 
Increased rate 13.28% 13.01% 10.10% 13.28% 
 
From Table 3, we can find out the profit of the whole supply chain is higher in the new contract than in the 
old contract, and the profit of each company is also differently higher than in the new contract than in the old 
contract. The parito improvement is achieved. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides a new supply chain contract model adapt to digital products such as online game, 
compares with the old model using simulation analysis. The old contract model in online game industry can not 
achieve coordination and causes the profit in whole supply chain not to achieve the optimization, but the new 
model can achieve coordination and the optimal profit in the whole supply chain, meanwhile the profits of all 
the companies will increase. The risk is spread around very well all the companies in the online game supply 
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